The American Crisis I:

The Spirit of Thomas Paine or of George Washington?

“These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.” Those famous, inspiring words. Are they Thomas Paine’s sentiments or George Washington’s? They are more connected to Washington than one would think.

In the autumn of 1776, after the fall of New York, George Washington was at the end of his rope; he had just lost a significant battle and his direct command was in retreat with a strong opponent in pursuit. He needed help - fast. 

But, during his first year as Commander-in-Chief, no amount of imploring, cajoling, or appealing could get him what he desperately needed: a committed, properly equipped, spirited fighting force. How could he convince people to join him now, when all looked lost? He was a military man, after all, not a speaker or a writer.  Luckily for him, he had the Revolution’s greatest propagandist in his midst, as Thomas Paine had been with the army since July. Perhaps Paine could help? Washington asked him to fight with a pen and not a rifle, and he dutifully did so by publishing the Crisis December 19th. 

However, on closer inspection, it would seem that a fair amount of the paper, perhaps a third or so, was not based on the thoughts and ideas of Paine, but those of Washington, but, to be sure, embellished and adjusted by Paine to fit the narrative (what would Paine know about running a campaign?). Paine used more of quotes than notes in writing this part of the paper, breathing new life into Washington’s previously expressed (yet, mostly private) sentiments by taking the case to the people.

Let’s examine Washington’s correspondence in real time. Selected letters and general orders are presented in chronological order; Washington’s words - in italics - are keyed alphabetically to the Crisis (presented at the end, followed by source citations), where we can see how Paine restated Washington’s thoughts:

Outgoing Correspondence From George Washington – Autumn 1776

Hancock, September 2

(C). All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded and as fully convinced, as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost if their defense is left to any but a permanent, standing army. I mean one to exist during the war.

From an excess of tenderness, we were unwilling to raise an army, and trusted our cause to the temporary defense of a well-meaning militia. A summer's experience has now taught us better; yet with those troops, while they were collected, we were able to set bounds to the progress of the enemy, and, thank God! They are again assembling. I always considered militia as the best troops in the world for a sudden exertion, but they will not do for a long campaign.

Author’s note: Washington wanted a standing army from the outset and, therefore, always objected to the use of militia, even though he had to use them for want of other troops. Here, Paine publicizes Washington’s opinion in the hopes that men would volunteer for the cause and serve in the Continental Army instead of joining militias and, simultaneously, lets the serving militias save face by recognizing their contributions.

Hancock, September 8

(K). The fears of the enemy, and even the declarations of Congress demonstrate that on our side the war should be defensive 

Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could have induced me to support an offensive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and destroys my property, and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to "bind me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I to suffer it?

(D). I confess I have not found that readiness to defend even strong posts at all hazards which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them. The honor of making a brave defense does not seem to be a sufficient stimulus when the success is very doubtful and the falling into the enemy’s hands probable: But I doubt not this will be gradually attained. 

In which case Fort Lee could be of no use to us; for it must occur to every thinking man, whether in the army or not, that these kind of field forts are only for temporary purposes, and last in use no longer than the enemy directs his force against the particular object which such forts are raised to defend.

(E). Nor am I insensible of the contrary effects if a brilliant stroke could be made with any probability of Success, especially after our loss upon Long Island

A single successful battle next year will settle the whole.

(G). We are now taking every method in our power to remove the stores &c. in which we find almost insuperable difficulties. 

Our ammunition, light artillery, and the best part of our stores, had been removed.

Author’s note: The grouping of the subjects in this letter suggests rather clearly that the letter (or, possibly, discussions about it) was the source for the section. Washington is communicating that the way to win the war is to be defensive, but not static, and to wait for a “brilliant stroke”, once he has been re-supplied, re-equipped, and reinforced. Paine succinctly presents the case, curiously (or not so much) mere days before the stroke was to take place.

Lund Washington, September 30

(U). In short, such is my situation that if I were to wish the bitterest curse to an enemy on this side of the grave, I should put him in my stead with my feelings; and yet I do not know what plan of conduct to pursue. I see the impossibility of serving with reputation, or doing any essential service to the cause by continuing in command, and yet I am told that if I quit the command inevitable ruin will follow from the distraction that will ensue. In confidence I tell you that I never was in such an unhappy, divided state since I was born. To lose all comfort and happiness on the one hand, whilst I am fully persuaded that under such a system of management as has been adopted, I cannot have the least chance for reputation, nor those allowances made which the nature of the case requires; and to be told, on the other, that if I leave the service all will be lost, is, at the same time that I am bereft of every peaceful moment, distressing to a degree.

To Hancock, October 4

(U). Your army, as I mentioned in my last, is upon the eve of its political dissolution—True it is you have voted a larger one in lieu of it, but the season is late, and there is a material difference between voting of battalions and raising of men. In the latter, there are more difficulties than Congress are aware of; which makes it my duty (as I have been informed of the prevailing sentiment of this army) to inform them, that unless the pay of the officers (especially that of the field officers) is raised, the chief part of those that are worth retaining will leave the service at the expiration of the present term; as the soldiers will also, if some greater encouragement is not offered them than twenty dollars, & one hundred acres of land.

These are the times that try men's souls.

Author’s note: These are the times that try men’s souls or the times that try one man’ssoul? Why not both? The letter to his brother shows that Washington is in private despair at his own prospects, as much as those of the cause. The letter to Hancock reveals the reason Paine was asked to write the paper, to offer some greater encouragement. Washington must have expressed these fears to Paine and asked him to provide it.

Patrick Henry, October 5

(H). Indeed the advantage obtained over the enemy’s light troops, might have been improved perhaps to a considerable extent had we been in a proper situation to have made use of this favorable crisis; but a want of confidence in the generality of the troops has prevented me from availing myself of that and almost every other opportunity which has presented itself.

The American Crisis

Author’s note: Washington was referring to an incident which occurred during the Battle of Harlem Heights, when he referred to the “crisis” of the Continental position at the time, but Paine must have realized the electric effect the word would have in describing the patriot cause on the whole and he used it to title the paper. 

General Orders, October 13

(I). And to encourage, and animate them so to do, there is every advantage of ground and situation, so that if we do not conquer, it must be our own faults

However, the fault, if it were one, was all our own; we have none to blame but ourselves.

Author’s note: A second case where Paine uses a concept for one thing, an individual battle, to express a feeling for the whole, the timing of the campaign.

Trumbull, October 20

(J). If this is not done—I fear—I am certain that the fatal consequences attendant on mutiny and plunder must ensue—indeed the latter will be authorized by necessity.

America could carry on a two years' war by the confiscation of the property of disaffected persons, and be made happy by their expulsion.

Author’s note: An incredible admission by Washington made palatable by Paine. The authorization of plunder and confiscation!

Hancock, November 6

(F). I think it highly probable and almost certain, that he will make a descent with a part of his troops into Jersey, and as soon as I am satisfied that the present maneuver is real and not a feint, I shall use every means in my power to forward a part of our force to counteract his designs. 

Howe would endeavor to penetrate the Jerseys

Author’s note:  This sentiment is connected to the next. 

General Greene, November 7

(V). they can have no capital object in view unless it is Philadelphia—making excursions only into the Jerseys, unless it is for forage, is playing no more than a small game, but such a one as may be necessary for them 

All that Howe has been doing for this month past, is rather a ravage than a conquest

Author’s note: Washington will use the word “ravage”, later, but Paine uses it here to mock British intentions. If they will not attempt to capture Philadelphia, than they are simply cruel occupiers. Paine skillfully animates both ideas in readers’ minds as the truly distasteful outcomes they would be.

Hancock, November 19 – 21

(M). 21st. The unhappy affair of the 16th has been succeeded by further misfortunes. Yesterday morning a large body of the enemy landed between Dobb’s Ferry and Fort Lee. Their object was evidently to enclose the whole of our troops & stores that lay between the North & Hackensack Rivers, which form a very narrow neck of land. 

Our situation there was exceedingly cramped, the place being a narrow neck of land between the North River and the Hackensack.

Author’s note: While there aren’t too many different ways to explain the situation, especially after the fact, can there be much debate that Paine took these words directly from Washington?

(N). Our men were ordered to meet them, but finding their numbers greatly superior & that they were extending themselves to seize on the passes over the river 

…immediately ordered them under arms

Author’s note: It was important to show that, even while retreating, the army was ready to fight at a moment’s notice, which was certainly Washington’s feeling, no matter how bad things were. Paine turns a negative impression into a positive one, doesn’t he?

(O). It was thought prudent to withdraw our men, which was effected and their retreat secured. We lost the whole of the cannon that was at the Fort, except two twelve pounders, and a great deal of baggage—between two & three hundred tents—about a thousand barrels of flour & other stores in the quarter master’s department. This loss was inevitable. As many of the stores had been removed, as circumstances & time would admit of. The ammunition had been happily got away. 

Our first object was to secure the bridge over the Hackensack

We brought off as much baggage as the wagons could contain, the rest was lost. The simple object was to bring off the garrison, and march them on till they could be strengthened by the Jersey or Pennsylvania militia, so as to be enabled to make a stand.

Author’s note: Again, Paine turns a negative impression into a positive one. The bringing off (“securing” – both men use this word) of the garrison is emphasized more than the loss of cannon, baggage, and tents. But, it is undeniable that he felt the need to mention such things, in such a way, to support the general’s actions.

Lee, November 21

(V). I have resolved to avoid any attack though by so doing I must leave a very fine country open to their ravages, or a plentiful store house, from which they will draw voluntary supplies.

…waited a mean opportunity to ravage the defenseless Jerseys

Author’s note: Continued focus on ravages.

Hancock, December 5

(X). I am clear in opinion, that if 40,000 men had been kept in constant pay since the first commencement of hostilities, and the militia had been excused doing duty during that period, the continent would have saved money.

why our new army at both ends of the continent is recruiting fast, and we shall be able to open the next campaign with 60,000 men, well-armed and clothed

Author’s note: How did Paine arrive at 60,000 men, when the numbers in the field had been considerably smaller? If you’re going to embellish, why not go all the way? Washington mentions 40,000 men as a proper fighting force, Paine assures the reader that there will be 50% more than that number in the field soon enough, which would be a more proper fighting force, it would seem. This section is related to (Q), as well – collected and collecting.

Heath, December 12

(L). Their views are to get possession of Philadelphia; however it is very probable they will considerably extend them, unless we can procure a sufficient force to oppose their progress.

Howe, it is probable, will make an attempt on this city [Philadelphia]; should he fail on this side the Delaware, he is ruined.

Author’s note: This is a magnificent message of recruitment and inducement by employing impending doom. Washington expressed it in a straightforward manner; Paine echoed it and added hope, “he is ruined”, if the Patriots succeeded.

Samuel Washington, December 18

(P). The retreat of the enemies army from the White Plains led me to think that they would turn their thoughts to the Jerseys, if no further, and induced me to cross the North River with some of the troops in order if possible to oppose them.

Howe dared not risk a battle; and it is no credit to him that he decamped from the White Plains

Author’s note: Paine’s explanation for events turns Washington’s explanation a bit on its head, but always in favor of the Continentals. By this time, December 18th, it was necessary to explain these events to the people.

(Q). Since I came on this side I have been reinforced by about 2,000 of the city militia, and understand that some of the country militia (from the back counties) are on their way—but we are at present in a very disaffected part of the province, and between you and me I think our affairs are in a very bad way

Once more we are again collected and collecting

Author’s note: A brilliant, succinct outlook by Paine, as he focuses on the increase in the number of troops, rather than the plight of the army.

(R). If they had given us any support we might have made a stand at Hackensack, and after that at Brunswick, but the few militia that were in arms disbanded themselves or slunk off in such a manner upon the approach of danger as to leave us quite unsupported, & to make the best shift we could without them.

The sign of fear was not seen in our camp, and had not some of the cowardly and disaffected inhabitants spread false alarms through the country, the Jerseys had never been ravaged.

Author’s note: Paine explains that no stand was made at Hackensack because of disaffection, but he does not go so far as to mention it was found within the army; the cowardice comes from outside. Yet another turn of Washington’s directness into inspiring (and warning) positivity. “Ravage” makes another appearance to drive the point home.

(W). However under a full persuasion of the justice of our cause I cannot but think the prospect will brighten although for wise purposes it is, at present hid under a cloud

I know our situation well, and can see the way out of it.

Author’s note: Paine says he knows the situation and can see the way out of it, but he is merely repeating Washington’s conclusions, as the general, despite everything, was not quite ready to give up. Paine seized the sentiment, made it his own, and attempted to soothe the colonies by publishing it. Also, in spite of all hardships, by now Washington has replenished his numbers (if nothing else) to the same point as he was before the Battle of Harlem heights, where he suffered a great loss.

Correspondence From Before the Autumn of 1776

Author’s note: Speaking of seizing sentiment, going back to Washington’s general orders of July 2, Paine covers several themes from them in the Crisis. Even though Paine condenses, magnifies, and emphasizes Washington, in all fairness, the themes were part of public feeling, reducing the probability of direct influence. Yet, the orders contain many of the salient points of the Crisis. Their importance demanded repetition.

General Orders, July 2

(T). The time is now near at hand which must probably determine, whether Americans are to be, freemen, or slaves; whether they are to have any property they can call their own; whether their houses, and farms, are to be pillaged and destroyed, and they consigned to a state of wretchedness from which no human efforts will probably deliver them. The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of this army—Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves us no choice but a brave resistance, or the most abject submission; this is all we can expect—We have therefore to resolve to conquer or die: Our own country’s honor, all call upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion, and if we now shamefully fail, we shall become infamous to the whole world—Let us therefore rely upon the goodness of the cause, and the aid of the supreme being, in whose hands victory is, to animate and encourage us to great and noble actions—The eyes of all our countrymen are now upon us, and we shall have their blessings, and praises, if happily we are the instruments of saving them from the tyranny meditated against them. Let us therefore animate and encourage each other, and shew the whole world, that a freeman contending for liberty on his own ground is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth.

As the enemy seem now to be endeavoring to strike some stroke, before the close of the campaign, the general most earnestly conjures, both officers and men, if they have any love for their country, and concern for its liberties; regard to the safety of their parents, wives, children and countrymen; that they will act with bravery & spirit, becoming the cause in which they are engaged; And to encourage, and animate them so to do, there is every advantage of ground and situation, so that if we do not conquer, it must be our own faults—How much better will it be to die honorable, fighting in the field, than to return home, covered with shame and disgrace; even if the cruelty of the enemy should allow you to return? A brave and gallant behavior for a few days, and patience under some little hardships, may save our country, and enable us to go into winter quarters with safety and honor. 

By perseverance and fortitude we have the prospect of a glorious issue; by cowardice and submission, the sad choice of a variety of evils - a ravaged country - a depopulated city - habitations without safety, and slavery without hope - our homes turned in to barracks and bawdy-houses for Hessians, and a future race to provide for, whose fathers we shall doubt of.

...but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.

Author’s note: And, finally, going back to a few of Washington’s correspondences from as many as twelve months earlier, Washington’s attitudes and spirit, although by now more public and more shared amongst the revolutionaries, can be seen to have had some impact on the Crisis.

Circular to the General Officers, September 8th, 1775

(A). These among many other reason’s which might be assigned, induce me to wish a speedy finish of the dispute; but, to avoid these evils we are not to lose sight of the difficulties—the hazard—and the loss that may accompany the attempt—nor, what will be the probable consequences of a failure.

Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives everything its value.

Trumball, February 19 

(S). I am so restrained in all my military movements for want of these necessary supplies, that it is impossible to undertake any thing effectual; and while I am fretting at my own disagreeable situation, the world, I suppose, is not behind hand in censuring my inactivity—A golden opportunity has been lost, perhaps not to be repaired again this year

We did not make a proper use of last winter, neither could we, while we were in a dependent state. 

John Washington, March 31

(B). It is not sufficient for a man to be a passive friend & well-wisher to the cause. This, and every other cause, of such a nature, must inevitably perish under such an opposition. every person should be active in some department or other, without paying too much attention to private interest, It is a great stake we are playing for, and sure we are of winning if the cards are well managed—Inactivity in some—disaffection in others—and timidity in many, may hurt the cause; nothing else can, for unanimity will carry us through triumphantly in spite of every exertion of Great Britain, if linked together in one indissoluble Band

I turn with the warm ardor of a friend to those who have nobly stood, and are yet determined to stand the matter out: I call not upon a few, but upon all: not on this state or that state, but on every state: up and help us; lay your shoulders to the wheel; better have too much force than too little, when so great an object is at stake. Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to repulse it. Say not that thousands are gone, turn out your tens of thousands; throw not the burden of the day upon Providence, but "show your faith by your works," that God may bless you.

Conclusion

Isn’t all of this obvious? Everyone knew this fact or that, didn’t they? Paine was merely recounting general knowledge, wasn’t he? Yes, but not only general knowledge, but the General’s knowledge, as well. Remember, these are Washington’s personal papers. How many people would have seen them or even known of their existence at the time? By their very nature, plans and strategies would not be published or, even if observed, properly discerned as to intentions. Could any average New Jersey citizen imagine that he army in his midst was not in headlong retreat, but was actually regrouping? 

If the conclusions are accepted, than the Crisis must be viewed as the publication of Washington’s“greater encouragement”, as much, if not more so than that of the state of the Cause.

(U): These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; (T): but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. (A): Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives everything its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as freedom should not be highly rated. Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has a right (not only to tax) but "to bind us in all cases whatsoever" and if being bound in that manner, is not slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth. Even the expression is impious; for so unlimited a power can belong only to God.

Whether the independence of the continent was declared too soon, or delayed too long, I will not now enter into as an argument; my own simple opinion is, that had it been eight months earlier, it would have been much better. (S): We did not make a proper use of last winter, neither could we, while we were in a dependent state. (I): However, the fault, if it were one, was all our own; we have none to blame but ourselves. But no great deal is lost yet. (V): All that Howe has been doing for this month past, is rather a ravage than a conquest, which the spirit of the Jerseys, a year ago, would have quickly repulsed, and which time and a little resolution will soon recover.

I have as little superstition in me as any man living, but my secret opinion has ever been, and still is, that God Almighty will not give up a people to military destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to perish, who have so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to avoid the calamities of war, by every decent method which wisdom could invent. Neither have I so much of the infidel in me, as to suppose that He has relinquished the government of the world, and given us up to the care of devils; and as I do not, I cannot see on what grounds the king of Britain can look up to heaven for help against us: a common murderer, a highwayman, or a house-breaker, has as good a pretense as he.

'Tis surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through a country. All nations and ages have been subject to them. Britain has trembled like an ague at the report of a French fleet of flat-bottomed boats; and in the fourteenth [fifteenth] century the whole English army, after ravaging the kingdom of France, was driven back like men petrified with fear; and this brave exploit was performed by a few broken forces collected and headed by a woman, Joan of Arc. Would that heaven might inspire some Jersey maid to spirit up her countrymen, and save her fair fellow sufferers from ravage and ravishment! Yet panics, in some cases, have their uses; they produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always short; the mind soon grows through them, and acquires a firmer habit than before. But their peculiar advantage is, that they are the touchstones of sincerity and hypocrisy, and bring things and men to light, which might otherwise have lain forever undiscovered. In fact, they have the same effect on secret traitors, which an imaginary apparition would have upon a private murderer. They sift out the hidden thoughts of man, and hold them up in public to the world. Many a disguised Tory has lately shown his head, that shall penitentially solemnize with curses the day on which Howe arrived upon the Delaware.

As I was with the troops at Fort Lee, and marched with them to the edge of Pennsylvania, I am well acquainted with many circumstances, which those who live at a distance know but little or nothing of. (M):Our situation there was exceedingly cramped, the place being a narrow neck of land between the North River and the Hackensack. Our force was inconsiderable, being not one-fourth so great as Howe could bring against us. We had no army at hand to have relieved the garrison, had we shut ourselves up and stood on our defense. (G): Our ammunition, light artillery, and the best part of our stores, had been removed, on the apprehension that (F):Howe would endeavor to penetrate the Jerseys, (D): in which case Fort Lee could be of no use to us; for it must occur to every thinking man, whether in the army or not, that these kind of field forts are only for temporary purposes, and last in use no longer than the enemy directs his force against the particular object which such forts are raised to defend. Such was our situation and condition at Fort Lee on the morning of the 20th of November, when an officer arrived with information that the enemy with 200 boats had landed about seven miles above; Major General [Nathaniel] Green, who commanded the garrison, (N): immediately ordered them under arms, and sent express to General Washington at the town of Hackensack, distant by the way of the ferry = six miles. (O): Our first object was to secure the bridge over the Hackensack, which laid up the river between the enemy and us, about six miles from us, and three from them. General Washington arrived in about three-quarters of an hour, and marched at the head of the troops towards the bridge, which place I expected we should have a brush for; however, they did not choose to dispute it with us, and the greatest part of our troops went over the bridge, the rest over the ferry, except some which passed at a mill on a small creek, between the bridge and the ferry, and made their way through some marshy grounds up to the town of Hackensack, and there passed the river. (O): We brought off as much baggage as the wagons could contain, the rest was lost. The simple object was to bring off the garrison, and march them on till they could be strengthened by the Jersey or Pennsylvania militia, so as to be enabled to make a stand. We staid four days at Newark, collected our outposts with some of the Jersey militia, and marched out twice to meet the enemy, on being informed that they were advancing, though our numbers were greatly inferior to theirs. Howe, in my little opinion, committed a great error in generalship in not throwing a body of forces off from Staten Island through Amboy, by which means he might have seized all our stores at Brunswick, and intercepted our march into Pennsylvania; but if we believe the power of hell to be limited, we must likewise believe that their agents are under some providential control.

I shall not now attempt to give all the particulars of our retreat to the Delaware; suffice it for the present to say, that both officers and men, though greatly harassed and fatigued, frequently without rest, covering, or provision, the inevitable consequences of a long retreat, bore it with a manly and martial spirit. All their wishes centered in one, which was, that the country would turn out and help them to drive the enemy back. Voltaire has remarked that King William never appeared to full advantage but in difficulties and in action; the same remark may be made on General Washington, for the character fits him. There is a natural firmness in some minds which cannot be unlocked by trifles, but which, when unlocked, discovers a cabinet of fortitude; and I reckon it among those kind of public blessings, which we do not immediately see, that God hath blessed him with uninterrupted health, and given him a mind that can even flourish upon care.

I shall conclude this paper with some miscellaneous remarks on the state of our affairs; and shall begin with asking the following question, Why is it that the enemy have left the New England provinces, and made these middle ones the seat of war? The answer is easy: New England is not infested with Tories, and we are. I have been tender in raising the cry against these men, and used numberless arguments to show them their danger, but it will not do to sacrifice a world either to their folly or their baseness. The period is now arrived, in which either they or we must change our sentiments, or one or both must fall. And what is a Tory? Good God! What is he? I should not be afraid to go with a hundred Whigs against a thousand Tories, were they to attempt to get into arms. Every Tory is a coward; for servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the foundation of Toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel, never can be brave.

But, before the line of irrecoverable separation be drawn between us, let us reason the matter together: Your conduct is an invitation to the enemy, yet not one in a thousand of you has heart enough to join him. Howe is as much deceived by you as the American cause is injured by you. He expects you will all take up arms, and flock to his standard, with muskets on your shoulders. Your opinions are of no use to him, unless you support him personally, for 'tis soldiers, and not Tories, that he wants.

I once felt all that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel, against the mean principles that are held by the Tories: a noted one, who kept a tavern at Amboy, was standing at his door, with as pretty a child in his hand, about eight or nine years old, as I ever saw, and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was prudent, finished with this unfatherly expression, "Well! give me peace in my day." Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that a separation must some time or other finally take place, and a generous parent should have said, "If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace;" and this single reflection, well applied, is sufficient to awaken every man to duty. Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world, and she has nothing to do but to trade with them. A man can distinguish himself between temper and principle, and I am as confident, as I am that God governs the world, that America will never be happy till she gets clear of foreign dominion. Wars, without ceasing, will break out till that period arrives, and the continent must in the end be conqueror; for though the flame of liberty may sometimes cease to shine, the coal can never expire.

America did not, nor does not want force; but she wanted a proper application of that force. Wisdom is not the purchase of a day, and it is no wonder that we should err at the first setting off. (C):From an excess of tenderness, we were unwilling to raise an army, and trusted our cause to the temporary defense of a well-meaning militia. A summer's experience has now taught us better; yet with those troops, while they were collected, we were able to set bounds to the progress of the enemy, and, thank God! They are again assembling. I always considered militia as the best troops in the world for a sudden exertion, but they will not do for a long campaign. (M): Howe, it is probable, will make an attempt on this city [Philadelphia]; should he fail on this side the Delaware, he is ruined. If he succeeds, our cause is not ruined. He stakes all on his side against a part on ours; admitting he succeeds, the consequence will be, that armies from both ends of the continent will march to assist their suffering friends in the middle states; for he cannot go everywhere, it is impossible. I consider Howe as the greatest enemy the Tories have; he is bringing a war into their country, which, had it not been for him and partly for themselves, they had been clear of. Should he now be expelled, I wish with all the devotion of a Christian, that the names of Whig and Tory may never more be mentioned; but should the Tories give him encouragement to come, or assistance if he come, I as sincerely wish that our next year's arms may expel them from the continent, and the Congress appropriate their possessions to the relief of those who have suffered in well-doing. (E): A single successful battle next year will settle the whole. (J): America could carry on a two years' war by the confiscation of the property of disaffected persons, and be made happy by their expulsion. Say not that this is revenge, call it rather the soft resentment of a suffering people, who, having no object in view but the good of all, have staked their own all upon a seemingly doubtful event. Yet it is folly to argue against determined hardness; eloquence may strike the ear, and the language of sorrow draw forth the tear of compassion, but nothing can reach the heart that is steeled with prejudice.

Quitting this class of men, (B): I turn with the warm ardor of a friend to those who have nobly stood, and are yet determined to stand the matter out: I call not upon a few, but upon all: not on this state or that state, but on every state: up and help us; lay your shoulders to the wheel; better have too much force than too little, when so great an object is at stake. Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to repulse it. Say not that thousands are gone, turn out your tens of thousands; throw not the burden of the day upon Providence, but "show your faith by your works," that God may bless you. It matters not where you live, or what rank of life you hold, the evil or the blessing will reach you all. The far and the near, the home counties and the back, the rich and the poor, will suffer or rejoice alike. The heart that feels not now is dead; the blood of his children will curse his cowardice, who shrinks back at a time when a little might have saved the whole, and made them happy. I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death. My own line of reasoning is to myself as straight and clear as a ray of light. (K): Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could have induced me to support an offensive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and destroys my property, and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to "bind me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I to suffer it? What signifies it to me, whether he who does it is a king or a common man; my countryman or not my countryman; whether it be done by an individual villain, or an army of them? If we reason to the root of things we shall find no difference; neither can any just cause be assigned why we should punish in the one case and pardon in the other. Let them call me rebel and welcome, I feel no concern from it; but I should suffer the misery of devils, were I to make a whore of my soul by swearing allegiance to one whose character is that of a sottish, stupid, stubborn, worthless, brutish man. I conceive likewise a horrid idea in receiving mercy from a being, who at the last day shall be shrieking to the rocks and mountains to cover him, and fleeing with terror from the orphan, the widow, and the slain of America.

There are cases which cannot be overdone by language, and this is one. There are persons, too, who see not the full extent of the evil which threatens them; they solace themselves with hopes that the enemy, if he succeed, will be merciful. It is the madness of folly, to expect mercy from those who have refused to do justice; and even mercy, where conquest is the object, is only a trick of war; the cunning of the fox is as murderous as the violence of the wolf, and we ought to guard equally against both. Howe's first object is, partly by threats and partly by promises, to terrify or seduce the people to deliver up their arms and receive mercy. The ministry recommended the same plan to Gage, and this is what the Tories call making their peace, "a peace which passeth all understanding" indeed! A peace which would be the immediate forerunner of a worse ruin than any we have yet thought of. Ye men of Pennsylvania, do reason upon these things! Were the back counties to give up their arms, they would fall an easy prey to the Indians, who are all armed: this perhaps is what some Tories would not be sorry for. Were the home counties to deliver up their arms, they would be exposed to the resentment of the back counties who would then have it in their power to chastise their defection at pleasure. And were any one state to give up its arms, that state must be garrisoned by all Howe's army of Britons and Hessians to preserve it from the anger of the rest. Mutual fear is the principal link in the chain of mutual love, and woe be to that state that breaks the compact. Howe is mercifully inviting you to barbarous destruction, and men must be either rogues or fools that will not see it. I dwell not upon the vapors of imagination; I bring reason to your ears, and, in language as plain as A, B, C, hold up truth to your eyes.

I thank God, that I fear not. I see no real cause for fear. (W): I know our situation well, and can see the way out of it. While our army was collected, Howe dared not risk a battle; and it is no credit to him that he decamped from the White Plains, and (V): waited a mean opportunity to ravage the defenseless Jerseys; but it is great credit to us, that, with a handful of men, we sustained an orderly retreat for near an hundred miles, brought off our ammunition, all our field pieces, the greatest part of our stores, and had four rivers to pass. None can say that our retreat was precipitate, for we were near three weeks in performing it, that the country might have time to come in. Twice we marched back to meet the enemy, and remained out till dark. (R):The sign of fear was not seen in our camp, and had not some of the cowardly and disaffected inhabitants spread false alarms through the country, the Jerseys had never been ravaged. (Q):Once more we are again collected and collecting; (X): our new army at both ends of the continent is recruiting fast, and we shall be able to open the next campaign with sixty thousand men, well-armed and clothed. This is our situation, and who will may know it. (T): By perseverance and fortitude we have the prospect of a glorious issue; by cowardice and submission, the sad choice of a variety of evils - a ravaged country - a depopulated city - habitations without safety, and slavery without hope - our homes turned into barracks and bawdy-houses for Hessians, and a future race to provide for, whose fathers we shall doubt of. Look on this picture and weep over it! And if there yet remains one thoughtless wretch who believes it not, let him suffer it unlamented.

December 23, 1776

The present winter is worth an age, if rightly employed; but, if lost or neglected, the whole continent will partake of the evil; and there is no punishment that man does not deserve, be he who, or what, or where he will, that may be the means of sacrificing a season so precious and useful. 

Citations

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The American Crisis, http://www.ushistory.org/Paine/crisis/c-01.htm .