A Conversation With George Washington
The Strategic Design For The Battle of Trenton
The import of the Battle of Trenton during the American Revolution is well-known: the Continental Army had reached a breaking point and somehow, some way, George Washington was able to turn certain defeat of the “Cause” into a stunning victory, saving the day for the rebellious colonies.
How did he pull off the victory at Trenton?
Would it surprise you to learn that the battle was hoped for (yes, hoped for, in a manner of speaking) and planned for a year and half in advance of its occurrence? It would seem that way, if we consult George Washington’s correspondence from 1775 and 1776.
The story begins when Washington was posted to command the Continental Army at Boston in July 1775. As any competent commander would do, immediately upon his arrival, he issued organizing orders, he gathered intelligence about the enemy’s dispositions, and most importantly, he took stock of the forces and supplies available to him.
For the most part, though, he was not happy with what he found, especially when it came to the condition of his troops. He immediately began a personal appeal for men, money, and materiel, which continued, nearly daily, in the year and a half preceding Trenton. Of course, it was for good reason, as the patriot forces were ill-equipped, ill-fed, badly paid, and subject to a fair of amount of irresponsible officers’ poor conduct.
Since the army was in such a state, he expected continual losses, with the only hope of lasting success coming from a “lucky blow” on a lightly-defended post, which could end the war quickly. Nonetheless, he vowed to keep fighting until fortune could change his outlook.
In a strange sort of way, he got what he wished for when the British evacuated Boston and left for New York. Incredibly, the battles there and the Retreat Across the Jerseys played out more or less as he expected strategically (although his losses were certainly more than he expected), causing conditions at Trenton to be “ripe”, as he put it, for the hoped for lucky blow.
Maybe you don’t believe it; it sounds far-fetched. In that case, there’s only one thing to do: let’s ask the man himself!
Author’s Note: In order to “interview” George Washington, some grammatical liberties had to be taken with Washington’s correspondences, the main sources used to research his thoughts and plans; verb tenses had to be changed and helping words added or deleted in order to allow conversation to flow. The reader can judge the faithfulness of the changes by consulting the supporting documentation following the article.
Wisqiti – Welcome, General Washington. How were things when you first arrived in Boston to take command of the Continental troops?
G.W. - Our situation was a little unfavorable, but not so bad but that I thought we could give them a pretty warm reception if they thought proper to make any advances towards us. Their situation was such as to secure them from any attack of ours.
From some Intelligence out of Boston and sundry corroborating circumstances, there was great reason to suspect, that the ministerial troop intended either to make a diversion to the southward, or wholly to remove. If they should have done either, it was most probable New York would be the place of their destination.
Their loss in the Battle at Charlestown (from the few recoveries of their wounded) was greater than at first supposed.
Wisqiti - You seemed rather confident, despite the condition of your men.
G.W. - I daresay the men would have fought very well (if properly officered) although they were an exceeding dirty and nasty people. Had they been properly conducted at Bunker Hill (on the 17th of June) or those that were there properly supported, the Regulars would have met with a shameful defeat; and a much more considerable loss than they did, which is now known to be exactly 1,057 killed and wounded.
Wisqiti - What then, after Bunker Hill and your establishment in Boston, was the plan for the prosecution of the war?
G.W. - I was very sensible that the situation of the inhabitants of Long Island, as well as of all those on the coast, exposed them greatly to the ravages of the enemy; and it was to be wished general protection could be extended to them, consistent with the prosecution of those great plans, which had been adopted for the common safety. This was early foreseen, and the danger provided for by a resolution of Congress, that each province should depend on its own internal strength against these incursions: the prejudice arising from them (even if successful) not being equal to that of separating the army into a number of small detachments, who would be harassed in fruitless marches, and countermarchs after an enemy whose conveyance by shipping was so advantageous, that they might keep the whole coast in constant alarm without our being able perhaps at any time to give them vigorous opposition.
We were well and in no fear or dread of the enemy, being, in our own opinion at least, very securely entrenched, and wishing for nothing more than to see the enemy out of their strong holds, that the dispute may come to an issue.
Wisqiti – But?
G.W. - The inactive state we laid in was exceedingly disagreeable especially as we could see no end to it, having had no advices from Great Britain to form a judgment upon.
Unless the ministerial troops in Boston were waiting for reinforcements, I could not devise what they were staying there after and why (as they affected to despise the Americans) they did not come forth, and put an end to the contest at once. They suffered greatly for want of fresh provisions notwithstanding they have pillaged several Islands of a good many sheep and cattle. They were also scarce of fuel, unless (according to the acct of one of their deserters) they meant to pull down houses for firing. In short, they were from all accounts suffering all the inconveniencies of a siege.
We had the same strength as before the detachment made under Col. Arnold.
Wisqiti – Yet, you made no movement of the army. Why?
G.W. - From the various accounts received from Europe, there was reason to expect troops would be landed at New York or some other middle colony. I was glad to know the pleasure of the Congress, whether upon such an event it would be expected that a part of this army should be detached, or the internal force of such colony, and its neighborhood, be deemed sufficient: or whether in such case I was to wait the particular direction of Congress.
Wisqiti – That left plenty of time for refitting and making plans for the campaign, didn’t it?
G.W. - The state of inactivity, in which the army had lain for some time, by no means corresponded with my wishes, by some decisive stroke to relieve my country from the heavy expense its subsistence must create.
It gave me great pain, to be obliged to solicit the attention of the honorable Congress, to the state of the army, in terms which implied the slightest apprehension of being neglected. But, my situation was inexpressibly distressing, to see the winter fast approaching upon a naked army, the time of their service within a few weeks of expiring, and no provision, yet made for such important events. Added to these, the military chest was totally exhausted. The paymaster had not a single dollar in hand. The Commissary General assured me he had strained his credit for the subsistence of the army to the utmost. The Quartermaster General was precisely in the same situation and the greater part of the troops were in a state not far from mutiny, upon the deduction from their stated allowance. I knew not to whom I was to impute this failure, but I was of opinion, if the evil was not immediately remedied and more punctuality observed in future, the army must absolutely break up.
Not an officer in the army but looked for an attack. This had no effect upon the Connecticut Regiments. They were resolved to go off.
Wisqiti – You paint quite an unfavorable picture of your own troops. Yet, you were somewhat reinforced, weren’t you?
G.W. - The returns for men enlisted [in late November] amounted to about 1,800, making in the whole 7,140. The militia that had come in, both from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, were very fine looking men, and went through their duty with great alacrity. The dispatch made, both by the people in marching, and by the legislative powers in complying with my requisition, gave me infinite satisfaction.
Wisqiti – Now, General, you seem to flip-flop a bit; the men are in mutiny, but the men volunteered with “alacrity”. Which was it?
G.W. - It is not in the pages of history perhaps, to have furnished a case like ours; to maintain a post within musket shot of the enemy for six months together, without and at the same time to disband one army and recruit another, within that distance, of twenty-odd British regiments, was more probably than ever was attempted; But, if we had succeed as well in the last, as we did heretofore in the first, I would have thought it the most fortunate event of my whole life.
Wisqiti – And so you persevered. Or, perhaps the British forced your hand by pulling up stakes from Boston, heading for New York, as you expected?
G.W. - Having undoubted intelligence of the fitting out a fleet at Boston, and of the embarkation of troops from thence which, from the season of the year and other circumstances, must have been destined for some expedition south of it; and having such information as I could have depended upon, that the inhabitants of Long Island in the colony of New York, or great part of them, were inimical to the rights and liberties of America, and from their conduct and professions had discovered an apparent inclination to assist in subjugating their fellow citizens to ministerial tyranny, there was great reason to believe that the armament, if not designed against the City of New York was nevertheless intended for Long Island. It was a matter of the utmost importance to prevent the enemy from possessing themselves of the City of New York, and the North River, which would have given them the command of the country, and the communication with Canada.
To me it appeared that the period had arrived, when nothing less than the most decisive and vigorous measures should be pursued.
Wisqiti – Then, why not undertake those “decisive and vigorous measures”?
G.W. - I was so restrained in all my military movements for want of necessary supplies, it was impossible to undertake any thing effectual; and while I fretted at my own disagreeable situation, the world, I supposed, was not behind hand in censuring my inactivity. A golden opportunity had been lost, perhaps not to be repaired again that year.
Wisqiti – Given that the British left Boston, what was next in your plans?
G.W. - It was most probable their destination was for New York, the vast importance of that place was doubtless a capital object with them. It was most certainly so to us, and in consequence of their shameful retreat I began to march part of the army immediately and followed with the remainder as soon as their accommodations on the road permitted.
Wisqiti – But, the army was no better off, was it? What could drive the men to continue to serve?
G.W. - It is not sufficient for a man to be a passive friend and well-wisher to a cause this, and every other cause, of such a nature, must inevitably perish under such an opposition. Every person should have been active in some department or other, without paying too much attention to private interest. It was a great stake we were playing for, and sure we were of winning, if the cards were well managed. Inactivity in some, disaffection in others, and timidity in many may have hurt the Cause; nothing else could, for unanimity would carry us through triumphantly in spite of every exertion of Great Britain, if linked together in one indissoluble band.
We had maintained our ground against the enemy and we had disbanded one army and recruited another, within musket shot of two and twenty regiments, the flower of the British army, when our strength had been little if any, superior to theirs. And, at last, had beaten them, in a shameful and precipitate manner out of a place the strongest by nature on this continent, strengthened and fortified in the best manner, and at an enormous expense.
Wisqiti – At last, you have reached New York, an island city. What were your plans there?
G.W. – it was of great importance to have a communication with the Jerseys and Long Island. I had several flat bottom boats built for the purpose and had thoughts of getting more for Passaic and Hackensack Rivers, where they would be equally necessary for transporting our army or part of it occasionally or succors coming to or going from it.
I approved much of the steps taken for securing the ferries as well as quieting the apprehensions of the inhabitants of Newark by the stationing of some troops there.
Upon full consideration of all circumstances I concluded to send the militia home except 500 to guard Bergen Neck, which I deemed an important post and capable of being used very much to our prejudice. I was also of opinion that a body about Woodbridge and Amboy would have been very useful. I proposed to retain the Morris County Militia for the first Purpose and left it to General Livingston to order the security of the other places. As to the militia who marched from distant parts, I supposed, like all others, they were impatient to return to their farms and business and, as others were discharged, it was difficult to keep them.
Wisqiti – And then, you found yourself waiting, again, for the British to make their intentions clearer. Yet, you were still making plans to stop them, somewhere, sometime?
G.W. - By several deserters from Staten Island and the ships of war whose accounts all agreed, General Howe proposed no attempt on us ‘til the arrival of his reinforcement, when, it was said, with a part of his army he would make a descent on the Jersey side, while the fleet and the other part of the army in conjunction would attack New York. To oppose this force in which the Ministry put so much confidence, I thought it necessary to exert our every nerve, and by defeating their views that campaign be enabled to meet them with double advantage the next, should they have thought it proper to pursue their unwarrantable measures.
Wisqiti – Alright, then. Would you sum up your eventual position in New York before the battles there took place?
G. W. - We had a powerful fleet within full view of us—distant about eight miles. We had General Howe’s army, consisting by good report of about eight or nine thousand men upon Staten Island, covered by their ships. We had Lord Howe just arrived (that is, about ten days prior) and we had ships now popping in which, we supposed, but didn’t know, to be part of the fleet with the expected reinforcement. When it arrived, if the report of deserters, prisoners, and Tories were to be depended upon, the enemy’s numbers would amount at least to 25,000 men. Ours to about 15,000. More, indeed, were expected, but there was no certainty of their arrival as harvest and a thousand other excuses were urged for the reasons of delay. What kind of opposition we should be able to make time only could show. I can only say that the men appeared to be in good spirits, and if they would stand by me, the place would not be carried without some loss, notwithstanding we were not yet in such a posture of defense as I could wish.
Wisqiti – That kind of build-up seems an enormous undertaking, on both sides.
G.W. - An attack was now therefore to be expected which would have probably decided the fate of America.
I threw what force I could over, without leaving myself too much exposed there; for our whole numbers, if the intelligence we got from deserters was true, fell short of that of the enemy. Consequently, the defense of our own works, and the approaches to them was all we could aim at. This then, in a manner, left the whole island in possession of the enemy, and of course, of the supplies it was capable of affording them.
A noble spirit (as far as I could judge of it) seemed to pervade the army. If we should be beaten (our numbers among friends being unequal to those of the enemy) it would not be, I flattered myself, ‘til after some hard knocks; which would not be very soon recovered of by the enemy. But, that superintending Providence, which needs not the aid of numbers, would lead us, I hoped to a more fortunate event.
Our numbers were a good deal short of those of the enemy, who had the further great advantage of us that by knowing their own points of attack, they could regulate matters accordingly, where as we were obliged, as far as we were able, to be prepared at all points. Our officers and men (such as were fit for duty) seemed to be in good spirits, but we were exceedingly sickly, more so than the army had been at any one time since I had commanded it. I had no doubt however, (at least I was flattered into a belief), that victory, if unfortunately it should have decided in favor of the enemy, would not be purchased at a very easy rate.
Wisqiti – And then, you suffered a great defeat. How could you keep the army together after such a loss?
G.W. - Both officers and soldiers were informed that the retreat from Long Island was made by the unanimous advice of all the general officers, not from any doubts of the spirit of the troops, but because they found the troops very much fatigued with hard duty and divided into many detachments, while the enemy had their main body on the island, and capable of receiving assistance from the shipping. In these circumstances it was thought unsafe to transport the whole of an army on an island, or to engage them with a part, and therefore unequal numbers; whereas now one whole army was collected together, without water intervening, while the enemy could receive little assistance from their ships; their army was, and must have been, divided into many bodies, and fatigued with keeping up a communication with their ships; whereas ours was connected, and could act together: They would have had to affect a landing under so many disadvantages, that if officers and soldiers were vigilant, and alert, to prevent surprise, and add spirit when they approached, there would be no doubt of our success.
Wisqiti – What, then, was the strategic result of the Battle of Long Island?
G.W. - Our number of men fit for duty was under 20,000. They were so by the last returns and best accounts I could get after the engagement on Long Island. Since which numbers had deserted. I had had no doubt in my own mind of defending New York nor should I have had if the men would do their duty, but this I despaired of. It was painful and extremely grating to me to give such unfavorable accounts, but it would have been criminal to conceal the truth at so critical a juncture. Every power I possessed was exerted to serve the Cause, and my first wish was, that whatever may be the event, the Congress would do me the justice to think so. If we would be obliged to abandon New York, ought it to stand as winter quarters for the enemy? They would have derived great conveniences from it on the one hand and much property would be destroyed on the other. It was an important question, but could admit of but little time for deliberation. I dare say the enemy meant to preserve it if they could. If Congress therefore resolved upon the destruction of it, the resolution should have been a profound secret as the knowledge of it would have made a capital change in their plans.
Wisqiti – That sounds like, in your mind, you were now willing to give up New York. If you were not keen on holding onto to the city which you had deemed to be the key position to the campaign a few months earlier, what would be the next course of action?
G.W. - It appeared to me of the utmost importance and that the most salutary consequences may result from our having a strong encampment at the post on the Jersey side of the North River, opposite to Mount Washington.
Wisqiti – You wanted to establish a position in New Jersey, but why not continue to fight the British in New York?
G.W. - It was extremely perilous and from every movement of the enemy and the intelligence received, their plan of operations was to get in our rear, and by cutting off the communication with the main, oblige us to force a passage through ‘em on the terms they wish, or to become prisoners in some short time for want of necessary supplies of provision. We took every method in our power to remove the stores, etc., in which we found almost insuperable difficulties. They were so great and so numerous, that I feared we should not effect the whole before we met with some interruption. I fully expected that an attack somewhere would have been made. In that I was disappointed, and happy would l have been if my apprehensions were not confirmed by the event. If it was deferred a little while longer, I flattered myself, all would be got away, and our force be more concentrated and, of course, more likely to resist them with success.
The fears of the enemy, and even the declarations of Congress demonstrated that on our side the war should be defensive; it was even called a war of posts, that we should have on all occasions avoided a general action or put anything to the risk unless compelled by a necessity into which we ought never to be drawn. The arguments on which such a system was founded were deemed unanswerable and experience gave her sanction. With these views and being fully persuaded that it would be presumption to draw out our young troops into open ground against their superiors both in number and discipline, I never spared the spade and pickaxe. I confess I did not find that readiness to defend even strong posts at all hazards which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them. The honor of making a brave defense did not seem to be a sufficient stimulus when the success was very doubtful and the falling into the enemy’s hands probable. But, I doubted not this would be gradually attained. We were in a strong post but not an impregnable one, nay acknowledged by every man of judgement to be untenable unless the enemy make the attack upon lines when they could avoid it and their movements indicated that they meant to do so.
Wisiqiti – A continual defensive posture must be a hard sell to everyone, especially the troops in the line.
G.W. - I was sensible a retreating army was encircled with difficulties, that the declining an engagement subjects a general to reproach and that the common cause may be affected by the discouragement it may throw over the minds of many. Nor was I insensible of the contrary effects if a brilliant stroke could be made with any probability of success, especially after our loss upon Long Island. But, when the fate of America was at stake on the issue, when the wisdom of cooler moments and experienced men had decided that we should protract the war, if possible, I could not think it safe or wise to adopt a different system when the season for action drew so near a close. That the enemy meant to winter in New York there could be no doubt. That with such an armament they could drive us out was equally clear. The Congress having resolved that it should not be destroyed nothing seemed to remain but to determine the time of their taking possession. It was our interest and wish to prolong it as much as possible, provided the delay did not affect our future measures.
The army was upon the eve of its political dissolution. True, Congress had voted a larger one in lieu of it, but the season was late, and there is a material difference between voting of battalions and raising of men.
Wisqiti – You’ve described the general condition and spirit of the army and the loss of New York, in particular. What was it like for you to be in charge at such a critical juncture?
G.W. – It was a most unfortunate affair which gave me great mortification as we had lost not only two thousand men that were there, but a good deal of artillery, and some of the best arms we had.
I was wearied almost to death with the retrograde motions of things, and solemnly protested that a pecuniary reward of 20,000 £s a year would not induce me to undergo what I did and, after all, perhaps, to lose my character, as it is impossible, under such a variety of distressing circumstances to conduct matters agreeable to public expectation or even of those who employed me, as they would not make proper allowances for the difficulties their own errors had occasioned.
Wisqiti – And yet, you persevered.
G.W. - I could not indulge an idea that General Howe, supposing he was going to New York, meant to close the campaign and to sit down without attempting something more. I thought it highly probable and almost certain, that he would make a descent with a part of his troops into Jersey.
The force that was sent to Jersey, in addition to those there, made it necessary for me to go with them, to put things in a proper channel, and such a way of defense, as shall seem most probable to check the progress of the enemy in case they should attempt a descent there or a move towards Philadelphia.
Wisqiti – Now we come to the retreat Across the Jerseys. Putting yourself between your enemy and your capital is a logical strategic move. Would you detail how it was carried out?
G.W. - As Fort Lee was always considered as only necessary in conjunction with that on the east side of the river, to preserve the communication across, and to prevent the enemy from a free navigation, it became of no importance by the loss of the other or, not so material as to employ a force for its defense. Being viewed in this light, and apprehending that the stores there would be precariously situated, their removal was determined on to Bound Brook, above Brunswick, Princeton, Springfield and Acquackinac Bridge, as places that would not be subject to sudden danger in case the enemy should pass the river and which were thought proper, as repositories for some of our stores of provision and forage. The troops belonging to the flying camp, under Generals Herd and Beal with what remained of General Ewing’s Brigade, were at Fort Lee, where they continued ‘til the stores were got away. By the time that would be effected, their term of enlistment would be near expiring, and if the enemy should make a push in that quarter, the only troops that there would be to oppose ’em, would be Hand’s, Hazlet’s, the regiments from Virginia and Smallwood’s, the latter greatly reduced by the losses it sustained on Long Island, etc., and sickness. Nor were the rest by any means complete. In addition to these, there were a few of the militia of New Jersey, which had been called in by Governor Livingston. I made such a disposition of the whole at Brunswick, and at the intermediate posts as seemed most likely to guard against the designs of the enemy, and to prevent them making an irruption or foraging with detached parties.
But, as New Jersey was almost a dead flat, we had not an entrenching tool, and not above 3,000 men, and they much broken and dispirited not only with our ill success but the loss of their tents and baggage, I had resolved to avoid any attack, though by so doing, I must leave a very fine country open to their ravages, or a plentiful store house, from which they would draw voluntary supplies.
The enemy was evidently changing the seat of war to the New Jersey side of the North River that it therefore would expect the Continental Army to give what support they could and failing in this would cease to depend upon or support a force from which no protection is given to them. It was therefore of the utmost Importance that at least an appearance of force should be made to keep New Jersey in the connection with the others. If that could not continue, it was much to be feared that its influence on Pennsylvania would be very considerable and more and more endanger our public interests.
I sent forward Col. Humpton to collect proper boats and craft at the ferry for transporting our troops and it was of infinite importance to have every other craft, besides what he took for the above purpose, secured on the west side of Delaware, otherwise they could fall into the enemy’s hands and facilitate their views.
Wisqiti – It is starting to sound like you were repositioning, rather than retreating, although, to be accurate, the move was technically a retreat.
G.W. - As nothing but necessity obliged me to retire before the enemy, and leave so much of the Jerseys unprotected, I conceived it my duty, and it corresponded with my inclination to make head against them so soon as there was the least probability of doing it with propriety.
Wisqiti – Something else started happening at this time, didn’t it? Just when things looked bleakest, a series of fortunate events – which you attributed to “Providence”, at one point, began to occur. The first being an apparent reduction in British forces. The second, a fortuitous rainstorm.
G.W. - General Heard informed me, that a person, on whose veracity he could depend, reported to him that he counted 117 sail of ships going out of the Hook.
The number of the enemy said to be embarked was supposed to be rather exaggerated. That there was an embarkation was not to be doubted, it being confirmed through various channels. By Col. Griffin who went from Brunswick with a Captain Sims to pass him by our guards, and who was detained by Lord Cornwallis on account of his situation, the amount of General Clinton’s force from what he could collect from the officers, was about 6,000. As to their destination, he could not obtain the least information. By him I also learned, the enemy were in Brunswick, and that some of their advanced parties had proceeded two miles on this side. The heavy rain that had fallen had probably checked their progress, and may have prevented their further movement.
Wisqiti – And the next being the addition of troops, when you were stationed across the Delaware?
G.W. - From the best accounts we had between 3,000 and 3,500 men before the Philadelphia Militia and German Battalion arrived, they amounted to about 2,000.
Every step was to be taken to collect force not only from Pennsylvania but from the most neighborly states. If we could keep the enemy from entering Philadelphia and keep the communication by water open for supplies, we could make a stand.
Wisqiti – And the next bit of providence being the dividing of the British forces facing you and the appearance of some help on the New Jersey side?
G.W. – Hand’s regiment informed me, that a body of the enemy was marching to Burlington. He had been sent over with a strong scouting party and, at daybreak, fell in with their advanced guards, consisting of about 400 Hessian troops, who fired upon him before they were discovered, but without any loss, and obliged him to retreat with his party and to take boat.
The enemy laid a good deal scattered, and to all appearance, in a state of security. A lucky blow in this quarter would have been fatal to them, and would most certainly raise the spirits of the people, which were quite sunk by our late misfortunes.
From advices I had of their movements by some prisoners and others, they appeared to be leaving Trenton and to be filing off towards Princeton and Allentown.
I was advised by a letter from the Council of Safety that Cols. Burd and Gilbraeth were marching with their battalions of militia and also that some small parties were assembling in Cumberland County.
I received information that the body of the enemy which lay at Pennington under Lord Cornwallis, moved back towards Princeton. It looked as if they were going into quarters, and this corresponded with the account brought by a prisoner, a servant belonging to Gen Vaughan’s family, who said he heard his master talk of going soon into winter quarters. The body that lay at Trenton were filing off towards Allentown and Bordentown, with their baggage, which mad me conjecture they were taking the road to South Amboy. I was in great hopes that the disappointment in boats and the lateness of the season, which began to put on the face of winter, would prevent their making any attempt upon Philadelphia ‘til spring.
Wisqiti – “Providence” could also include the weather, which seems to have stopped the advances of the British several times during the retreat. Did it come into play again?
G.W. - The care and vigilance which were used in securing the boats on the Delaware, baffled every attempt of the enemy to cross, but from concurring reports and appearances, they were waiting for ice to afford them a passage.
By the information of an officer, who with a scouting party, was reconnoitering between Princeton and Trenton, three battalions of British troops were marching from the former to the latter, and from a variety of accounts and concurring circumstances, there seemed to be the strongest reason to believe the enemy would attempt to pass the river, as soon as the ice was sufficiently formed for that purpose.
Wisqiti – But, the ice never solidified. Through your descriptions, we can feel the fates pulling you to a decision to act. You finally had the opportunity to effect that “brilliant stroke” you mentioned earlier.
G.W. - Christmas day at night, one hour before day was the time fixed upon for our attempt on Trenton. Our numbers, sorry I am to say, being less than I had any conception of, but necessity, dire necessity, would, nay must have justified any attempt. The more we could attack, at the same instant, the more confusion we would spread and greater good would result from it.
We could not ripen matters for our attack before so much out of sorts, and so much in want of everything, were the troops under Sullivan, etc.
Wisqiti – But, attack they did, nonetheless.
G.W. - In justice to the officers and men, I must add, that their behavior upon this occasion, reflected the highest honor upon them. The difficulty of passing the river in a very severe night and their march through a violent storm of snow and hail did not in the least abate their ardor. But, when they came to the charge, each seemed to vie with the other in pressing forward and were I to give a preference to any particular corps, I should do great injustice to the others.
Wisqiti – Thank you, General.
George Washington